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Abstract. Graph convolution network (GCN) have achieved state-of-
the-art performance in the task of node prediction in the graph struc-
ture. However, with the gradual various of graph attack methods, there
are lack of research on the robustness of GCN. At this paper, we will
design a robust GCN method for node prediction tasks. Considering the
graph structure contains two types of information: node information and
connection information, and attackers usually modify the connection in-
formation to complete the interference with the prediction results of the
node, we first proposed a method to hide the connection information
in the generator, named Anonymized GCN (AN-GCN). By hiding the
connection information in the graph structure in the generator through
adversarial training, the accurate node prediction can be completed only
by the node number rather than its specific position in the graph. Specif-
ically, we first demonstrated the key to determine the embedding of a
specific node: the row corresponding to the node of the eigenmatrix of the
Laplace matrix, by target it as the output of the generator, we designed
a method to hide the node number in the noise. Take the correspond-
ing noise as input, we will obtain the connection structure of the node
instead of directly obtaining. Then the encoder and decoder are spliced
both in discriminator, so that after adversarial training, the generator
and discriminator can cooperate to complete the encoding and decod-
ing of the graph, then complete the node prediction. Finally, All node
positions can generated by noise at the same time, that is to say, the gen-
erator will hides all the connection information of the graph structure.
The evaluation shows that we only need to obtain the initial features
and node numbers of the nodes to complete the node prediction, and the
accuracy did not decrease, but increased by 0.0293.
Keywords: First keyword · Second keyword · Another keyword.
1 Introduction
Graphs are ubiquitous in the real world, it is the core for many high impact
applications ranging from the analysis of social networks, over gene interaction
networks, to interlinked document collections. In many tasks related to graph
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structure, node classification has always been a hot issue, which can be described
as: predicting the labels of unknown nodes based on a small number of labeled
known nodes. The usual task flow is to first use graph encoding (or embedding)
methods such as GCN to obtain the embedding of each node, and then decode
the node embedding to obtain its label. Through the research of the researchers,
various graph encoding and decoding methods were proposed, which improved
the task of node prediction from all angles.
However, with the deepening of research, the vulnerability of node prediction
has been gradually explored, even only slight deliberate perturbations of the
nodes features or the graph structure can lead to completely wrong predictions.
An obvious reason is that the embedding of nodes is significantly affected by their
position (represents the connection structure of the entire graph and the position
of the nodes in it) in the graph. Specifically, after selecting the target node, the
attacker modifies the information directly or indirectly related to the node in the
graph structure, such as adding / deleting edges. Due to the discrete nature of the
graph, it is always possible to find a minimal action that significantly disrupts
the final prediction, to complete the attack on node prediction. In addition,
due to the separation of the encoder and decoder, an attacker can attack the
decoder, obtain the direction of movement embedded in the target node, and
attack by disturbing the graph structure information. This splits the task into
two independent tasks for different models, and each task has multiple attack
methods.
It can be seen that “position” is a key to node embedding. If we hide the
position of the node, the attacker will not be able to obtain information about
the target node, that is, it will not be able to make corresponding disturbances
to the node. Therefore, we propose an adversarial generation method for graph-
connected structures, which only needs to give the target node number and initial
features to obtain the accurate embedded features of the node. In this paper we
will provide the following:
1. Anonymized node. Through analysis and experiments, we have demon-
strated the key to determining the location of nodes, and designed a generator
that generates node locations from noise. The generator can receive the node
number without prior information of the graph structure, and accurately con-
firm the position of the node, instead of directly obtaining the location from the
graph structure. It realizes that only the node number and the node initial fea-
tures are required to accurately encode. Since the position of a node determines
the role of the node in the graph, we provide a encoding method that does not
require obtaining its position, that is, a method to make the node anonymized.
2. Accurate node classification. We design the method of adversarial
training so that the node can still be accurately embedded under anonymized.
Specifically, we spliced the encoder and decoder in the discriminator, so that the
generator can undertake the functions of both, and then perform accurate node
classification.
3. Completely anonymous graph. After adversarial training, the positions
of all nodes can be anonymous at the same time, that is to say, the graph can
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only contain node features, and all connection relationships are hidden in the
generator.
Finally, given the number of the target nodes, we can complete the anonymized
node classification, which significantly improves the robustness of the node clas-
sification.
2 Related Work
Attack. In 2018, Dai et al [1] and Zgner [2] first proposed adversarial attacks
on graph structures, after which a large number of graph attack methods were
proposed. Specific to the task of node prediction, Chang [3] attacked various
kinds of graph embedding model with black-box driven, Aleksandar [4] provide
the first adversarial vulnerability analysis on the widely used family of methods
based on random walks, derive efficient adversarial perturbations that poison
the network structure. Wang propose a threat model to characterize the attack
surface of a collective classification method, target on adversarial collective clas-
sification. Basically, all attack types are based on the modified graph structure
targeted by this article.
Defense without GAN. Tang [6] investigate a novel problem of improving
the robustness of GNNs against poisoning attacks by exploring clean graphs, cre-
ate supervised knowledge to train the ability to detect adversarial edges so that
the robustness of GNNs is elevated. Jin [7] use the new operator in replacement
of the classical Laplacian to construct an architecture with improved spectral
robustness, expressivity and interpretability. Zgner [8] propose the first method
for certifiable (non-)robustness of graph convolutional networks with respect to
perturbations of the node attributes.
Defense with GAN. As in this paper, some defense methods also use adver-
sarial training to enhance the robustness of the model. Deng [9] present batch
virtual adversarial training (BVAT), a novel regularization method for graph
convolutional networks (GCNs). By feeding the model with disturbed embed-
dings, the robustness of the model is enhanced by them, but this method trains
a full-stack robust model for the encoder and decoder at the same time, with-
out discussing the nature of the graph structure’s vulnerability and solving it.
Wang [10] first investigate the latent vulnerabilities in every layer of GNNs and
propose corresponding strategies including dual-stage aggregation and bottle-
neck perceptron. Then, to cope with the scarcity of training data, they propose
an adversarial contrastive learning method to train the GNN in a conditional
GAN manner by leveraging the high-level graph representation. But from a cer-
tain point of view, they still use the method based on node perturbation for
adversarial training. This method is essentially a kind of ”disturbance” learning,
and uses adversarial training to adapt the model to various custom perturba-
tions. This is a kind of node-based adversarial training, which requires a large
number of specific disturbances to be customized, and the potential structure of
the entire graph cannot be explored.
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Graph GAN without considering attack and defense. Wang [11] Com-
bining two methods of graph representation learning as generators and discrim-
inators, respectively, to improve the accuracy of both in adversarial training.
However, this method does not discuss the potential vulnerability of the graph
structure, nor does it attempt to accurately disturb the final classification, and
cannot be directly applied to the graph defense method. Ding [12]’s perspective
is extended to the regional structure of the entire graph, but the task goal is
still to obtain an accurate graph representation, and the generated fake samples
cannot match the various disturbances that are carefully designed for the model
vulnerabilities.
By summarizing the related work, it can be seen that there are no robust
graph embedding methods for the purpose of hiding the ”position” of the node,
and the existing robust model design methods that use adversarial training as a
means cannot solve the vulnerability of the graph structure from the root cause.
3 AN-GCN: Generators, discriminators and optimization
methods
We first specify some symbolic representations. Given a graph G with N nodes,
Its Laplacian matrix is represented as L, the matrix eigenvalues of L is expressed
as U =
 u1(1) · · · uN (1)... . . . ...
u1(N) · · · uN (N)
, ul =
 ul(1)· · ·
ul(N)
 represents the lth eigenvector,
u(l) = {u1(l), . . . , uN (l) represents row vector consisting of the values of all
eigenvectors at position l. Set X =
 f(1)· · ·
f(N)
, where X represents the feature
set of all nodes, and f(i) represents the feature of node i. Set XE =
 fe(1)· · ·
fe(N)
,
where XE represents the embedding feature set of all nodes, and fe(i) represents
the embedding feature of node i. For convenience, we use “node n” to mean “node
with the number of n”.
In the process of encoding the node feature X into XE , first obtain the
transpose matrix UT of the matrix eigenvalues U , convert the node features X
to the spectral domain through the UT , then complete the convolution through
the trainable diagonal matrix gθ(Λ) =
θ1 . . .
θN
, and finally use U Convert
from the spectral domain to the final node representation. The specific process
is as formula (1).
XE = σ
(
Ugθ(Λ)U
TX
)
(1)
In formula (1), U contains the information of the edges in the graph, we plan
to replace it with a matrix generated from Gaussian noise, so that the edges
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in the graph are no longer restricted by the existing topology, which makes the
attacks impossible delete / add edges (because the U recording the edge infor-
mation has been replaced by the generated matrix), and thus making all nodes of
the entire graph anonymous. Specifically, we will optimize the generative model
through adversarial training. In this section, we will introduce the structure of
the generator and discriminator, then give the method of model optimization.
3.1 Generator
Set node feature representation in the spectral domain Xspec = gθ(λ)U
TX, that
is, gθ(λ)U
T first integrate the features of all nodes X to obtain the spectral
domain convolution features Xspec, which still contains the features of all nodes.
After that, through f(1)e. . .
f(1)e
 = σ
 u(1)· · ·
u(N)
Xspec (2)
the embedding of each node is obtained from Xspec. The key of this process
is, each node through u(n) =
(
u
(n)
1 , . . . , u
(n)
N
)
to accurately obtain the final
feature embedding belonging to the simple node from the Xspec that contains
all the features. In other words, u(n) is the key to locate specific nodes. This
phenomenon is explained by Theorem 1
Theorem 1. In the process of GCN, u(n) affects the position of node n more
than u(ξ|ξ 6= n)
Proof. According formula 1, we get:
 fe(1). . .
fe(N)
 =
 u(1). . .
u(N)


θ1
(∑v−1
i=1 u1(i)f(i) +
∑N
j=v+1 u1(j)f(j)
)
. . .
θN
(∑v−1
i=1 uN (i)f(i) +
∑N
j=v+1 uN (j)f(j)
)
 (3)
so, to get the embedded attribute
fe(v) =
N∑
l=1
θlu
2
l (v)f(v)
v−1∑
i=1
ul(i)f(i) +
N∑
j=v+1
ul(j)f(j)
 (4)
of each node, It can be seen initially that the power of u(v) is greater than that
of u(ξ|ξ 6= n). Further, we explore the impact of u(n) on node positioning on
existing graphs, set
(∑v−1
i=1 ul(i)f(i) +
∑N
j=v+1 ul(j)f(j)
)
= ρ(v, l, Uv), where
Uv stands for U without u(v), used to express the influence of u(ξ|ξ 6= n) on
the embedding of node v. Next, we reduce the value of u(ξ|ξ 6= n) by a factor
of δ, that is, get the matrix eigenvalues U (δ,v) = {u(δ,v)i |i ∈ (1, N)}, u(δ,v)i ={
u(v), i = v
δu(v), i 6= v , obtain U
(δ,v) as the matrix eigenvalues, use the pre-trained gθ(Λ)
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for GCN. In order to explore the position of the δ effect (used to determine u(v)
and u(ξ|ξ 6= v) ) influence on the embedding accuracy of node v, move the
position of the δ effect to the cv neighbors {γ} adjacent to v (Select nodes
directly connected to v according to the weight of edges from large to small, the
order from largest to smallest is vclose = {vclose1 , . . . , vclosecv }. The final equation
for the embedding of node v act by δ is fe,δ(v) =
∑N
l=1 θlu
2
l (v)f(v)δρ(v, l, U
(δ,v)).
Using Chebyshev polynomial as the convolution kernel, and cora as the test data
set, set cv = 14, δ = 1 − k100 , k ∈ {1, . . . , 50}. The result is as fig 1. It can be
seen that only when δ acts on the target point v, the embedding accuracy will
suddenly drop(Measured by the Euclidean distance between fe(v) and fe,δ(v)),
expressed as dδv, and the other conditions will remain stable, in other words, u(v)
has a much greater impact on the embedding of node v than u(ξ|ξ 6= v).
embedding 
accuracy
Encoder
Fig. 1. The effect of δ on the accuracy of node embedding when acting on different
positions
Furthermore, we continue to explore the reverse effect of nodes on u(n) to
prove the effect of node position on u(n). Delete a node τ in the graph G to obtain
the deleted graph G(d)τ . Calculate the laplacian matrix L(d)τ ∼ R(N−1)×(N−1) and
matrix eigenvalues U
(d)
τ = {u(d)(1), . . . , u(d)(N − 1)} ∼ R(N−1)×(N−1). To keep
G(d)τ will connected, All edges connected to τ will be re-connected by traversal.
Specifically, we stipulate that ωij is the weight of connecting nodes i and j in G,
and ω
(d)
ij corresponds to graph G(d)τ . The calculation method of all edge weights
in G(d)τ is:
ω
(d)
ij =
{
ωij , ωτi = 0 or ωτj = 0
ωij+
ωτi+ωτj
2 , ωτi 6= 0, ωτj 6= 0
(5)
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After obtaining the fully connected G(d)τ , we recalculate corresponding U (d)τ ,
Obtain all β-order neighbors of τ : Naborβ(τ) = {τβ(1), τβ(2), . . .}, |Naborβ(τ)| =
b. For all the nodes to be deleted in each order, find u(Naborβ(τ)) corresponding
to the all position. Calculate the change of each u(τβ(·)) with the corresponding
node in G, that is, u(d)(τβ(·)). The quantitative representation of the change
between the two is as follows, ui represents the i-th item of the vector:
C
(
u (τβ(·)) , u(d) (τβ(·))
)
=
N−1∑
i=1
log |u (τβ(·))i |2 − log |u(d) (τβ(·))i |
2
(6)
Replace different betas and calculate C, the result is as shown in figure 2 Since
the node number will change after the node is deleted, because we previously
stated that the letter expression of the node is used instead of the node number,
so in this article, the expression of the node will not change after deleting a
node. We select the first 500 nodes according to the number of connections
from large to small. It can be seen from the figure 2 that after deleting node τ ,
the overall difference in the change of u (Naborβ(τ)) for each order neighbor is
large, and the u of the first-order neighbor u (Nabor1(τ)) has the largest change
(the vertical axis is −C). In other words, after the node τ is deleted, the u(·)
corresponding to its first-order neighbor the u(τ1(·)) has changed significantly,
while the u(τ2(·)) and u(τ3(·)) has changed less and showed a decreasing trend.
Since deleting node τ significantly affects the position of its first-order neighbors,
as the order increases, the degree of influence gradually decreases, so the change
of its u(τβ(·)) also gradually decreases. In other words, the position of node τ is
inseparable from u(τ), but has a small relationship with u(ξ|ξ 6= τ).
Fig. 2. After deleting τ , the change of neighbor u (Naborβ(τ)) of different orders β of
τ
When n is completely generated by noise, the specific points will be hidden
before the task requirements are clarified, thereby making the graph attack lose
its target. So we make u(n) as the generation target, and the output of the
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generator named uG(n), which tries to approximate the underlying true u(n)
distribution.
In order to enable the generator to locate a specific point, the input noise
of the generator will be constrained by the position of the target point, namely
Staggered Gaussian distribution, the purpose is to make the noise not only satisfy
the Gaussian distribution, but also do not coincide with each other, densely
distributed on the number axis.
Theorem 2. (Staggered Gaussian distribution). Given a minimum probability
ε, N Gaussian distributions centered on x = 0 satisfy P(x, n) ∼ Norm(2σ(2n−
N − 1)
√
log(
√
2piσε), σ2), so that the probability density function of each dis-
tribution is greater than ε. Where Norm represents the Gaussian distribution, n
represents the node number, σ represents the standard deviation, and ε represents
the set minimum probability.
Proof. Given a probability density function h(xp) of the Gaussian distribution
Norm(µp, σ
2), when h(xp) = ε,
xp = µp ± 2σ
√
log
(√
(2pi)σε
)
(7)
Let 2σ
√
log (
√
(2pi)σε) = r as the distance from the average value µp to maxi-
mum and minimum value of xp. Specify that each xp represents the noise distri-
bution of each node. In order to make all the distribution staggered and densely
arranged, stipulate max(xp) = min (xp+1), and keep all distributions symmet-
rical about x = 0. So , when the total number of nodes is N , µ1 = (1 − N)r,
µ2 = (3−N)r, . . ., µN = (N − 1)r, that is, µn = (2n−N − 1)r = 2σ(2n−N −
1)
√
log(
√
2piσε)
The process of generating sample uG(v) from staggered Gaussian noise Zv ∼
P (x, v) is expressed as uG(v) = G
(
Zv; θ
G
)
, θG denotes the weight of G. The
process of generator is as shown in Fig. 3.
3.2 Discriminator and GAN framework
After proposing the generation of uG(n), we need to set discriminator D to
evaluate the quality of uG(n) generated by generator G, and set the optimization
mechanism of the two In order to make uG(n) can complete the graph embedding
well.
We use graph embedding quality as an evaluation indicator to drive the entire
process of confrontation generation, rather than simply letting G fit U . (Doing so
may not guarantee the rigorous mathematical nature of the generating matrix,
but for analog graph generation, we only need to obtain the best applicable
sample, for example, it looks very similar to the target, rather than discussing
the rigor of generating the sample). Specifically, D is divided into two parts:
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Generator
imput imput
Generate Generate
Fig. 3. Generator with Staggered Gaussian distribution as input
D(enc) used for encode (embed) the graph, and D(dec) used for decode, whose
weights are gD,decθ (Λ) and θ
D,enc, respectively.
According to equation 4, Node embedding fe(v) = f(v)
∑N
l=1 θlu
2
l (v)ρ(v, l, Uv),
where two ul(v) are from U and U
T in Equation 1, respectively. In order to deal
with the impact caused by different positions, we set different initializations for
the two ul(v), ul(v) from U as the output of the generator, named g
(l,v). The
ul(v) from U
T as the initial weight of the discriminator, named udl (v), gradually
progressive to g(l,v) during the adversarial training, the general term formula for
its value in training epoch e is
udl,e(v) =
{
u(v), e = 1
udl,e−1(v) + q
(
Gl,e,v − udl,e−1(v)
)
, e > 1
(8)
In Equation 7, udl,e(v) represents the value of u
d
l (v) in epoch e. Gl,e,v represents
for the generated value of v at position l in epoch e. q is the custom progressive
coefficient. Next, we use fe,G(v) and fe,D(v) to represent the embedding of the
node v when using uG(v) and u(v) at epoch e, respectively. It can be seen that
the purpose of adversarial training is to make fe,G(v) and fe,D(v) as similar as
possible. The calculation equation for node embedding is:
fe,G(v) = f(v)
N∑
l=1
θlg
(l,v)udl,e(v)ρ(v, l, Uv) = u
G(v)gD,encθ (Λ)U
Df(v)
fe,D(v) = f(v)
N∑
l=1
θlu(v)u
d
l,e(v)ρ(v, l, Uv) = u(v)g
D,enc
θ (Λ)U
Df(v)
uG(v) =
{
g(1,v), . . . , g(N,v)
}
(9)
The process of GAG is given in the algorithm 1, UD,1 = U is the initialized fea-
ture matrix,
{
udl,e(γ) ∈ UD,e|γ ∈ (1, N)
}
for epoch e, and gradually approaches
the generator matrix during the training process. In each training epoch e, first
we obtain uG(v) and UD,e related to the target node v (According to theorem
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1, uG(v) target the position of v. According to equation 2, U is the key to the
conversion of graph convolution into spectral domain, and during the training
process, UD,e assumes the role of U). Specifically, generate the uG(v) from the
Staggered Gaussian noise corresponding to node v, and update the correspond-
ing column of UD,e−1 to UD,e. Second, we use D(enc) and D(dec) to evaluate
the quality of this epoch of generators, get the node embedding fe,G(v) of v
through D(enc), decode fe,G(v) through D(dec) to get the label possibility yfake.
Third, calculate the loss functions of yreal and yfake respectively, and update
the weight of D according to the gradient.The loss function of D is:
LossD(y) =
{
CrossEntropy (Sigmoid(y), labelv) , y = yreal
CrossEntropy (Sigmoid(y),Sample({labelγ |γ 6= v})) , y = yfake
(10)
where labeli represents the true label of node i (one-hot). Next we train G,
through obtain its label probability yfool of the output of G, and update the
weight of G according to the output of D, in order to make the output of G is
judged as real by D.
Formally, take u as input, we use D(u; θD) to express the output under the
weight θD = {gD,decθ (Λ), θD,enc}, G and D are playing the following two-player
minimax game with value function V (G,D):
max
θG
min
θD
N∑
v=1
(
Eu∈ULossD(D(u; θD)) + Eu∼G(Zv ;θG)
(
1− LossD(D(u; θD))
))
(11)
The AN-GCN process is represented by fig 4
G
Fig. 4. The main process of AN-GCN
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Algorithm 1 AN-GCN
Require: Weights of D: gD,decθ (Λ) is used for GCN (encoding), θ
D,enc is used to decode
to a specific label. Weights of G: θG. Training epoch of D and G.
1: Initialize UD = U
2: for Train epochs for D do
3: Random sample a node v
4: Sample m noise samples ZDv =
{
z
(v)
1 , . . . , z
(v)
m
}
from noise prior P (z, v)
5: uG(v)← G(Zv) // generate
6: • Column v of Ud moves closer to uG(n) with a coefficient of q
7: UD·v = U
D
·v + q
(
uG(v)− UD·v
)
8: • Embedding and decoding for real and fake samples
9: fe,G(v)← uG(v)gD,encθ (Λ)UDf(v) // Get node embedding with uG(v)
10: yfake ← fe,GθD,dec // Decoding, expressed as DUD (uG(v); θD)
11: fe,D(v)← u(v)gD,encθ (Λ)Uf(v) // Get node embedding with real u(v)
12: yreal ← fe,D(v)θD,dec // Decoding, expressed as DU (u(v); θD)
13: • Calculate the gradient of D and update the weight of D
14: ∇Dupdate ← ∇gD,dec
θ
(Λ),θD,enc
(LossD
(
yreal
)
+
(
1− LossD
(
yfake
))
15: for Train epochs for G do
16: Sample m noise samples Zv =
{
z
(v)
1 , . . . , z
(v)
m
}
from P (z, v)
17: yfool ← G(ZGv )gD,encθ (Λ)UDf(v)θD,dec // Get samples used to fool D
18: • Calculate the gradient of D and update the weight of D
19: ∇Gupdate ← ∇θG
(
1− LossD
(
yfool
))
20: end for
21: end for
Ensure: Trained generator weights θG.
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4 Evaluation
We hope that AN-GCN can output accurate node embedding while keeping the
node position completely generated by the well-trained generator, so we use the
accuracy of node embedding to evaluate the effectiveness of AN-GCN. More-
over, because the current graph attack method based on the modified graph
structure directly acts on the Laplace matrix, and AN-GCN ensures that the
matrix eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix is completely generated by the gen-
erator. Therefore, AN-GCN is immune to such attacks from the source, so we
no longer evaluate it by reproducing such attacks.
Since the generator does not directly generate the node embedding, but com-
pletes the node prediction task by cooperating with the trained discriminator,
we define the accuracy of the generator accG to be the accuracy of the node label
after G and D cooperate, that is accG =
TPG
N , TPG represents the number of
True Positive samples when G determines the node embedding, the calculation
method is
TPG =
N∑
γ=1
ζγ , ζγ =
{
1, argmax
(
DUD
(
G (Zγ) ; θ
D
))
= argmax (labelγ)
0, argmax
(
DUD
(
G (Zγ) ; θ
D
)) 6= argmax (labelγ) (12)
At the same time, the accuracy of the discriminator is the accuracy of classifying
nodes using U , accD =
TPD
N
TPD =
N∑
γ=1
ζγ , ζγ =
{
1, argmax
(
DU
(
u(γ); θD
))
= argmax (labelγ)
0, argmax
(
DU
(
u(γ); θD
)) 6= argmax (labelγ) (13)
Since G performs more than 1 training epochs within each epoch of D train-
ing, the acc change of D is represented by points, and the acc change of G is
represented by lines. They correspond to the same total epoch. We visualize UG
and XE during training. UG visualization uses the matshow function in numpy,
XE visualization uses tsne, and the nodes of different labels are marked with
different colors, that is to say, if the visualized XE shows good clustering and
the colors in the cluster are uniform, It can be proved that the generator locates
all nodes well. At the same time, we also use acc (accuracy) to quantify the node
classification accuracy of the discriminator. The result is shown in the figure 5
As shown in Figure 5, accD and accG are rising at the same time. When
epoch > 1400, accG remains at a high and stable state. We select G at epoch
= 1475 as the final model selection, and the node embedding accuracy is 0.8227.
We use accGCN to denote the accuracy of only GCN with the same kernal of D
as a comparison. In the 1500 epochs of training, the highest value of accGCN is
0.7934. The experimental results show that under the same convolution kernel
design, AN-GCN not only effectively maintains the anonymity of the node, but
also has a higher detection accuracy than only GCN 0.0293 higher.
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well performance
 =0.3780
 =0.6977
 =0.8227
 =0.7626
 =0.7934
Fig. 5. Accuracy and visualization of node embedding during training, and visualiza-
tion of node embedding
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We first proved that in GCN, the key to determining the position of node τ
in the graph is u(τ), and then we designed a generator that can encode the
node number, and generated the corresponding node number with u(τ) as the
target. Then we designed the discriminator to complete the identification of the
quality of u(G)(τ) generated by generator, and designed an optimization method
to combine the generator and the discriminator to complete the anonymous GCN
of the node, and then complete the anonymous GCN of the node position of the
whole graph, that is, AN- GCN.
At present, there is a problem with our work, that is, the generator contains
the position prior information UD of the graph. Although we try to make the
UD as close as possible to the generated samples during the training process,
thereby gradually eliminating the a prior information, we have not yet given a
specific judgment method to determine whether the a prior information reaches
a safe level. However, this has little effect on the anonymization of nodes, be-
cause the prior information UD implements the process of converting the overall
graph structure to the spectral domain, and does not involve the positioning of
individual nodes. That is to say, unless the attacker can modify the entire graph
structure, we will discuss the security of the prior information introduced by
UD, which is basically unrealistic.
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